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Should Cash Transfers Be Confined to the Poor? 
Implications for Poverty and Inequality in Latin America
1 
 
This paper compares for 13 Latin American countries the poverty and inequality impacts of 
cash transfer programs that are given to all children and the elderly (that is, “categorical” 
transfers), to programs of equal budget that are confined to the poor within each population 
group (that is, “poverty targeted” transfers). The analysis finds that both the incidence of 
poverty and the depth of the poverty gap are important factors affecting the relative 
effectiveness of categorical versus poverty targeted transfers. The comparison of transfers to 
children and the elderly also supports the view that choosing carefully categories of 
beneficiaries is almost as important as targeting the poor for achieving a high poverty and 
inequality impact. Overall, the findings suggest that although in the Latin American context 
poverty targeting tends to deliver higher poverty impacts, there are circumstances under 
which categorical targeting confined to geographical regions (sometimes called “geographic 
targeting”) may be a valid option to consider. This is particularly the case in low-income 
countries with widespread pockets of poverty.   
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help  the  poor  cope  with  economic  shocks,  but  also  as  longer‐term  poverty  alleviation 
programs  supporting  minimum  consumption  levels  and  promoting  the  accumulation  of 
human capital.  
Yet,  while  several  evaluations  have  demonstrated  the  impact  of  cash  transfers  on 
poverty reduction and human development outcomes, they do absorb an important share 
of governments’ budgets (Grosh et al., 2008; Fiszbein and Schady, 2010; World Bank‐IEG, 












the  primary  group  to  focus  social  assistance.
2  But  there  is  less  consensus  on  whether 
transfers should be given to all people within these categories (i.e. be “categorical”), or if 
they should be restricted to poor people within categories of beneficiaries (i.e. be “poverty 
targeted”).  While  poverty  targeted  transfers  are  more  cost  effective  because  limited 
resources are distributed among fewer beneficiaries, they remain more complex and costly 
to administer. And even the most sophisticated targeting systems miss some of the poor, 














best  approach  to  alleviate  poverty.  At  the  heart,  the  optimal  design  relates  to  societal 










































































































While,  by  their  nature,  poverty  targeted  transfers  always  deliver  a  higher  poverty 
impact,  both  the  incidence  of  poverty  and  the  depth  of  the  poverty  gap  appear  to  be 


















60+, universal 22‐29 782,660 1.30



















































support  households’  needs  beyond  food),  economic  efficiency  (e.g.,  avoidance  of  dead‐











From  an  ethical  perspective,  many  advocate  that  social  assistance  programs  should 
favor  horizontal  equity  and  that  any  person  falling  into  a  category  that  tends  to  be 










some  wealthier  individuals  (inclusion  error).  The  question  there  is  up  to  which  point  a 
society  is  ready  to  exclude  some  of  the  poor  from  assistance  because  of  efficiency 





remains  an  open  discussion.  When  the  benefits  of  social  assistance  programs  do  not 
become disproportionate, existing studies find that labor market distortions from poverty 
targeting remain moderate (Parker and Skoufias, 2000; Skoufias and Di Maro, 2011; Fiszbein 












                                                 
3 Programs focused on the elderly poor range for instance from 0.1 percent of GDP in the Seychelles to 10.6 
percent of GDP in Ethiopia. See Schwarz (2003), and Kakwani and Subbarao (2005).   7















much  on  local  conditions  (Coady  et  al.,  2004;  Grosh  et  al.,  2008).  In  designing  a  cash 
transfers program, one must have a clear idea of the incidence of poverty among the target 




there  enough  capacity  to  support  an  effective  and  transparent  targeting  system?  Only 
thereafter a clear assessment on whether and how to target can be performed. 
This  paper  abstains  from  ethical  considerations,  and  aims  at  contributing  to  the 













and  categorical  cash  transfers  to  children  up  to  five  years  of  age.  We  then  repeat  the 
exercise  for  social  pensions  to  elderly  people  of  age  65  and  higher,  and  conclude  by 






















behavioral  responses  were  considered.  Second,  the  impact  of  a  national  program  can   9
change substantially by urban and rural areas, and hence in a robustness exercise we discuss 
the  impacts  by  geographical  areas  separately.  Finally,  the  basic  simulations  neglect 
considerations related to the effectiveness of targeting, and assume that our hypothetical 






























































































4  to  6).  Observe  that  some  countries  in  the  sample  have  already  in  place  large  and 





































equivalent  program  for  children.  The  difference  in  poverty  impact  is  large:  on  average, 
categorical  transfers  to  children  are  1.6  times  more  effective  in  reducing  poverty  than 
categorical  transfers  of  equal  budget  to  the  elderly,  and  targeted  transfers  twice  more 
effective. The reasons are straightforward: poverty rates among the elderly are, on average, 
lower  than  for  children;  and  poorer  families  have  more  children,  but  not  more  elderly 
people. The simulations also suggest that the common belief that cash transfers to the 
elderly can reduce substantially poverty by trickling down to all family members has limited 




































In  all  countries  under  consideration,  a  targeted  cash  transfer  can  achieve  the  same 
poverty impact than a categorical one using from 2 to 13 times less resources. The large 
difference in costs suggest that in most countries some form of targeting, even if costlier 
and  far  from  perfect,  can  lead  to  large  efficiency  gains  and  allow  for  more  generous 
transfers  to  the  poor.  Efficiency  gains  show,  however,  strong  heterogeneity  across 


















pockets  of  poverty  show  strong  geographical  concentration,  implementing  a  more 






These  basic  simulations  miss  an  important  feature.  Actual  poverty  targeting,  means  or 
















































Figure  8  presents  the  poverty  impacts  of  the  various  variants.  In  all  countries,  the 
imperfectly  targeted  program  continues  to  deliver  a  better  poverty  impact  than  the 
categorical programs. The impact remain in fact closer to the perfectly poverty targeted 
program,  than  to  the  categorical  ones.  Nevertheless,  in  countries  where  differences 
between  targeted  and  categorical  systems  were  already  small,  the  attractiveness  of  a 
categorical  program  with  respect  to  an  imperfectly  targeted  one  has  now  increased:  in 

























































































the  age  groups.  With  the  exception  of  the  Dominican  Republic,  the  age  group  under 
consideration for a categorical transfer does not seem to alter significantly the results. This 
suggests that, overall, the distribution of income across age groups of children is such that 
providing  higher  transfers  to  a  narrower  group  delivers  a  similar  poverty  impact  than 





















































































programs’  poverty  impact  since,  for  a  given  budget,  targeted  programs  transfer  more 
resources to fewer beneficiaries. However, the extent to which these gains are substantial 





































out  social  pensions,  but  for  a  rebalancing  of  the  budget  of  social  assistance  programs 
towards the largest vulnerable groups. 
Overall,  the  findings  support  the  view  that  in  the  Latin  American  context  targeting 
assistance  to  the  poor  tends  to  deliver  higher  poverty  impacts.  There  are  nonetheless 
circumstances  under  which  simpler  schemes,  such  as  categorical  cash  transfers  for 
vulnerable  groups  that  are  geographically  confined  to  regions  with  strong  pockets  of 
poverty, may be a valid option to consider as an alternative to means tested or proxy means 
tested  programs.  This  is  particularly  the  case  in  low  income  countries  with  widespread 
pockets of poverty. 
We  would  like  to  conclude  with  a  note  of  caution.  To  achieve  comparability  across 
countries, the simulations abstained from looking at country specific factors that ought to 
be considered in the design of effective social assistance programs. Among these are more 
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Children Elderly Children Elderly
P0 8.34 6.01 8.10 3.26 7.83
P1 3.49 2.25 3.37 1.40 3.29
P2 2.20 1.33 2.11 0.92 2.07
P0 16.86 14.21 16.33 12.14 16.34
P1 6.90 5.17 6.68 3.74 6.59
P2 4.07 2.80 3.93 1.89 3.86
Gini 45.84 44.61 45.50 43.81 46.19
2,658.6          2,658.6          2,658.6          2,658.6         
2,268,498 2,531,433 326,361 36,797










Children Elderly Children Elderly
P0 33.34 32.34 32.60 30.49 30.92
P1 14.48 13.63 14.09 12.60 13.48
P2 9.15 8.40 8.89 7.54 8.52
P0 50.40 49.93 49.99 50.40 49.84
P1 25.14 24.35 24.60 23.86 24.08
P2 16.03 15.23 15.63 14.45 15.11
Gini 57.19 56.76 56.92 56.40 56.57
189.0              189.0              189.0              189.0             
1,347,935 576,899 581,007 145,778














Children Elderly Children Elderly
P0 15.02 13.06 14.86 9.39 14.40
P1 6.90 5.54 6.78 3.82 6.63
P2 4.70 3.49 4.57 2.44 4.49
P0 27.53 26.14 27.21 26.44 26.92
P1 12.40 10.87 12.22 9.34 12.00
P2 7.81 6.43 7.67 4.95 7.51
Gini 53.74 53.28 53.58 52.78 53.57
9,118.8          9,118.8          9,118.8          9,118.8         
16,181,389 15,087,966 4,971,594 421,067










Children Elderly Children Elderly
P0 4.25 3.39 3.99 2.10 3.56
P1 1.61 1.22 1.50 0.86 1.40
P2 0.98 0.72 0.91 0.56 0.87
P0 11.72 10.13 11.10 9.59 11.02
P1 3.84 3.14 3.62 2.56 3.45
P2 2.03 1.59 1.90 1.20 1.79
Gini 51.94 51.23 51.51 50.95 51.66
1,105.9          1,105.9          1,105.9          1,105.9         
1,362,349 1,831,181 101,987 38,906














Children Elderly Children Elderly
P0 8.09 7.08 7.66 4.17 6.88
P1 3.57 2.94 3.24 1.95 2.99
P2 2.38 1.89 2.06 1.39 1.95
P0 19.61 17.83 18.51 16.98 18.52
P1 7.19 6.27 6.70 4.90 6.39
P2 4.20 3.53 3.83 2.54 3.59
Gini 50.21 49.65 49.87 49.17 49.77
230.9              230.9              230.9              230.9             
410,092 330,723 58,776 28,524










Children Elderly Children Elderly
P0 16.11 14.63 15.35 10.73 13.43
P1 7.23 6.28 6.55 4.40 5.71
P2 4.73 3.95 4.09 2.77 3.61
P0 29.95 28.37 29.05 29.27 28.44
P1 13.15 12.01 12.38 10.37 11.39
P2 8.15 7.20 7.45 5.56 6.66
Gini 56.02 55.51 55.75 54.96 55.23
1,883.5          1,883.5          1,883.5          1,883.5         
4,807,219 2,962,392 1,109,547 524,883














Children Elderly Children Elderly
P0 16.37 14.42 15.31 9.73 13.72
P1 4.82 3.87 4.48 2.51 3.98
P2 2.09 1.57 1.92 0.99 1.71
P0 34.66 33.14 33.25 33.73 32.66
P1 12.59 11.37 11.92 9.93 11.15
P2 6.24 5.34 5.85 4.13 5.34
Gini 48.86 48.03 48.42 47.34 47.89
386.4              386.4              386.4              386.4             
1,000,142 692,105 249,589 74,183










Children Elderly Children Elderly
P0 19.17 17.46 18.08 13.55 16.00
P1 7.56 6.62 7.08 4.88 6.26
P2 4.48 3.77 4.12 2.71 3.66
P0 37.21 35.94 36.20 37.00 35.73
P1 15.36 14.18 14.64 12.90 13.67
P2 8.86 7.91 8.33 6.48 7.56
Gini 48.93 48.28 48.61 47.57 47.94
511.4              511.4              511.4              511.4             
1,386,874 1,253,728 364,580 204,886














Children Elderly Children Elderly
P0 33.83 32.82 32.98 31.58 31.53
P1 14.35 13.38 13.78 12.17 13.02
P2 8.12 7.28 7.70 6.31 7.23
P0 53.37 52.73 52.69 53.37 52.82
P1 25.49 24.57 24.87 24.06 24.20
P2 15.65 14.74 15.11 13.87 14.46
Gini 55.85 55.25 55.50 54.80 55.03
272.2              272.2              272.2              272.2             
2,086,598 616,632 901,217 179,004










Children Elderly Children Elderly
P0 13.96 11.61 12.74 6.96 11.32
P1 5.59 4.37 4.89 2.71 4.46
P2 3.35 2.47 2.87 1.59 2.67
P0 28.74 25.99 27.15 25.76 26.59
P1 11.36 9.70 10.35 7.59 9.73
P2 6.53 5.29 5.81 3.66 5.38
Gini 50.52 49.44 49.88 48.56 49.45
7,153.3          7,153.3          7,153.3          7,153.3         
11,633,955 7,189,108 2,393,781 1,120,543














Children Elderly Children Elderly
P0 42.52 41.92 41.90 41.30 40.86
P1 17.65 16.95 17.24 16.33 16.55
P2 9.79 9.20 9.49 8.69 9.02
P0 63.30 63.12 62.80 63.30 63.26
P1 31.11 30.50 30.65 30.27 30.27
P2 19.14 18.51 18.75 18.08 18.23
Gini 52.26 51.86 52.01 51.56 51.61
63.3                63.3                63.3                63.3               
663,747 270,890 342,936 86,167










Children Elderly Children Elderly
P0 15.99 13.53 14.73 7.65 13.00
P1 5.76 4.28 5.19 2.34 4.62
P2 3.02 2.05 2.68 1.17 2.43
P0 29.58 27.87 28.31 27.79 27.32
P1 12.25 10.49 11.39 8.21 10.53
P2 6.80 5.39 6.21 3.61 5.63
Gini 52.09 50.96 51.56 50.10 50.99
205.2              205.2              205.2              205.2             
370,654 282,508 92,402 36,492











Children Elderly Children Elderly
P0 19.52 17.83 18.48 14.26 16.31
P1 6.93 5.75 6.40 3.91 5.72
P2 3.43 2.59 3.12 1.60 2.82
P0 34.99 33.89 34.17 34.94 33.54
P1 14.68 13.44 14.00 12.20 13.09
P2 8.10 7.02 7.60 5.63 6.94
Gini 48.03 47.18 47.63 46.51 46.97
1,143.7          1,143.7          1,143.7          1,143.7         
3,751,466 2,517,343 1,199,495 421,194
0.84 1.24 2.61 7.44
Original Income 
(before transfers)
Categorical Targeted
Poverty line of US$2.5 
Poverty line of US$4
Peru
Annual Cost (in Millions)
Number of beneficiaries 
Transfer per beneficiary (2005 US$ Daily)